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ESTATE OF MICHELETTI

[So F. No. 16884.

[24 C.2d

In Bank. Sept. 22, 1944.]

Estate of ARTURO MICHELE'l'Tl, Deceased. FOSCA
PUCHEU, Appellant, V. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a
National Banking Association), as Executor, etc., Respondent.
[1] Perpetuities-Rule Against Perpetuities-Vesting Within Period of Rule.-Where executory interests in remainder created
by a will in favor of the issue of the testator's minor sons
must vest, if at all, within lives in being at the time of the
creation of the limitation, which is the time of the testator's
death (Civ. Code, § 749), such interests do not violate the
rule against perpetuities. This rule applies solely to remoteness of vesting.
[2&.2b] Trusts-Express. Trusts-Partial Invalidity.-Executory
interests created by a will in favor of the issue of the testator's minor sons, if invalid, did not vitiate other provisions
of the will creating a trust for the benefit of said sons, where
the interests limited to the sons' issue were separable from
the interests created in said sons, and where the testator's
intent to let the trust for these children stand had he contemplated failure of the limitations to their issue could be
inferred from the trust's purpose to 8'.lpport his minor sons
and to withhold the remainder until they were capable of managing it, and from the care used in selecting the .dispositive
language for the beneficiaries of the trust, as distinguished
from the lack of care in phrasing the executory interests.
[3] Perpetuities-Suspension of Power of Alienation.-The statutory rules against restraints on alienation have a beneficial
purpose, but they are not punitive.
[4] Wills - Validity-Partial InvaliditY.-Testamentary dispositions that are otherwise valid are not necessarily invalidated
by illegal limitations, and the testator's purpose must control
so far as it reasonably can.
[5] Id. - Validity - Partial Invalidity. - In order to ascertain
whether a testator intended that a prior interest created by
[1] See 20 Cal.Jur. 1034; 41 Am.Jur. 64.
[2] See 25 Cal.Jur. 298.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Perpetuities, § 3; [2] Trusts, § 74;
[3] Perpetuities, § 4; [4,5] Wills, § 305.
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his will should stand if an attempted succeeding interest
failed, consideration should be given to the language of the
will, including the extent to which the use of the same phrase
to define the duration of the prior interest and to attempt the
creation of the succeeding interest is to be regarded as a
mere economy of words in the creation of two independent
or interdependent interests; the surrounding circumstances;
the ineffectiveness of the succeeding interest; whether the
testator or an attorney prepared the will; the testator's knowledge or belief concerning the claimants on his bounty;. and
the age of the testator and of the donees.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County denying petition for partial distribution of a
decedent's estate. Aylett R. Cotton, Judge.4-ffirmed.
Bernard Nugent and John J. Taaffe for Appellant.
J. W. Coleberd for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Arturo Micheletti died September 21,
1940, at sixty years of age, leaving a net estate of $120,000
and a will executed March 26, 1940. Surviving him were two
adult children by his divorced wife,· a son, Otello Micheletti,
and a daughter, Fosca Pucheu (the present petitioner), his
second wife, 'reresa Piotti Micheletti, and two minor children
by his seeond marriage, Arturo Amadeo Micheletti, born July
24, 1928, and Manlio Elmo Micheletti, born April 8, 1930.
The ~ill was admitted to probate. On June 10, 1941, appellant filed her first amended petition for partial distribution
of the estate and claimed $10,000 as heir at law, contending
that the residuary bequest of her father's will creating a testamentary trust violated the rule agoainst perpetuities as well
as the rule against restraints on alienation in sections 715,·
716 and 771 of the Civil Code and was therefore void. From
the order of the superior court denying her petition, appellant brought this appeal.
Although appellant's petition is directed solely at the validity of the trust of the residue, the other parts of the will
as well as the testator's general plan are material to the consideration of the problems presented. The testator's personal
effects, household furnishings and automobiles are bequeathed
to his wife for life and upon her death to his two minor sons
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and to "all of my children born of my present marriage
after the date of this will and to those of them surviving me,
and to the surviving issue of them predeceasing me by right of
representation. " It will appear that this language is essentially similar to the dispositive language in the trust of the
resid1le set forth below. Mario Morosi, a son by a former
marriage of decedent's second wife, is bequeathed $1.000.
Appellant and her brother Otello are given indefeasible bequests of $2,500 each. In addition, Otello is the devisee of a
parcel of real property, and a trust is created for his use with
a eorpus of $40,000 to. provide him with monthly payments
of $60 until his death, at which time the trust is to terminate
and the balanee of the trust estate is to be paid into the t~s
tamentary trust of the residue "created for my said childretl
of my present marriage, and which said trust estate shall be
disbursed in accordance with the trust estate for my said children herein created for that purpose. " The provisions of tIll'
will for the creation and termination of the trust are:
"Tenth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estak
whether the same be real, personal or mixed, of whatever kind
or character, and wherever the same may be situate, of which
I may die seized or possessed, or in which I may have any
interest or right of testamentary distribution or power of
appointment at the time of my death, I hereby give, dC'visc
and bequeath to Bank of America National Trust aud Saving's
Association, a national banking assoeiation, in trust, nevertheless, for the use and benefit in equal shares to my sons,
Arturo Amadeo. Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Micheletti, to
all of my children born after the date of this my last will IlHd
testament, and to those Qf them surviving me and to the surviving issue of any of them predeceasing me by right of representation. Said balance of said estate is to be held by said
trustee, subject to. the uses, terms, conditions and limitations
particularly set forth."
Subdivision (a) provides for the "education, maintenance
and supPQrt of such children ... Until such child shall have
attained the age of twenty-five years.... " Subdivisio.n (b)
provides for a present vested gift from the trust estate of
$5,000 to eaeh of the minor sons with enjoyment postponed
until they reach the age of twenty-one years respectively, subject to divestment by failure to survive the testatQr or by the
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testator's surviving until the sons reach twenty-five years o.f
age.
" (c) The trust herein created for my said sons and their
issue shall cease and terminate as to. one-half (112) thereo.f
then remaining when my said children, Arturo. Amadeo. Micheletti and Manlio Elmo. Micheletti, o.r the survivo.r o.f my
said SQns shall have attained the age o.f twenty-five (25) years.
Upon the termination of that po.rtion of said trust by the
happening o.f said event, viz., the attaining o.f the age o.f
twenty-five (25) years by my said sons, o.r the survivo.r o.f
them, one-half (112) of said trust estate then remaining shall
be paid, delivered and conveyed in equal shares to said Arturo
Amadeo Micheletti and Manlio. Elmo Micheletti, or to the survivor of them and to the surviving issue of either o.f them then
deceased by right of representation; the one-half (V2) of the
said trust estate then remaining to be held in trust in accordance with the terms hereof until my said sons, Arturo Amadeo
Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Micheletti, or the survivor o.f said
sons shall have attained the age of thirty-two (32) years,
when such trust shall cease and terminate and all the trust
estate then remaining in the hands of the testamentary
trustee shall be paid, delivered and conveyed in equal shares
to said Arturo Amadeo Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Micheletti in equal shares, or to the survivor o.f them and to the
surviving issue, if any, of either of them then deceased by
right of representation.
"(d) It is my will and I hereby declare that any children
born of my present marriage after the execution of this will
and the survivor or survivors of them, and to their surviving
issue, if any, by right of representation, shall share in said
trust estate to the same extent and in equal manner and in
accordance with the same terms and conditions aR hcrein fixed
and provided for my two designated sons, Arturo Amadeo
Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Micheletti.
"Eleventh: None of the beneficiaries herein designated or
named other and except Fosca Pucheu, Otello Micheletti and
Mario Morosi shall receive any part o.f my estate other and
except the provisions herein specifically made for them until
such beneficiary shall have reached the age of twenty-one
years.
"Twelfth: . . . none of the said beneficiaries shall, in any
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event, either jointly or severally sell, assign, transfer, convey,
pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber his, her or their
interest or interests under these trusts .... "
[1] Appellant contends that the interests created in the
issue of Arturo and Manlio by the terms of the trust in article X and the limitations placed thereon by articles XI and
XII violate the rule against perpetuities and the prohibitions against restraints on alienation in the Civil Code. It is
nppellant's position that the rule against perpetuities is in
force in this state by reason of article XX, section 9, of the
California Constitution prohibiting perpetuities except for
eleemosynary purposes and section 4468 of the Political Code,
which makes the common law of England the rule of decisions in the courts of this state insofar as it is consistent
with the laws and Constitution of the state. There is considerable uncertainty as to the soundness of this position
(see 2 Simes, Law of Future Interest [1936], § 572, p. 473;
Rest., Property [Group No.1], Proposed Final Draft No.5
[1944], pp. 109-110), but it is unnecessary to determine that
question in this case, for the executory interests created by
the will in favor of the issue of the minor sons must vest, if
at all, within lives in being and are therefore not within the
operation of the rule against perpetuities, which applies solely
to remoteness of vesting. Each son is given an equitable interest in the trust property for years and a vested legal interest therein in remainder subject to divestment by death
before twenty-five years and to divestment of his share in
the one-half of the corpus remaining if he should survive to
twenty-five but die before thirty-two. These interests are
prevented from merging by the interposition of the trust. If
one son should die leaving issue surviving before reaching
the age of twenty-five, the executory interest would vest in
his issue subject to defeasance if the surviving son should die
before reaching the age of twenty-tlve, or subject to divestment as to one-half if the surviving son should survive to the
age of twenty-five but should die before reaching thirty-two.
Since the executory interests in remainder created in favor
of the issue must therefore vest, if at all, within lives in being
at the time of the creation of the limitation, which is here the
time of the death of the testator (Oiv. Code, § 740) they do
not violate the rule against perpetuities. (See Gray, Rule
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Against Perpetuities (4th cd.) § 201; 2 Simes, op. cit. supra,
§ 496.)
[2a] It has been suggested that the phrase in article XI
"other and except the provisions herein specifically made for
them" prevents that article from applying to any provision
in the will, including article X, specifically made for any
beneficiary and thus prevents a violation of the rule against
restraints on alienation. (See Civ. Code, §§ 715, 716 and
772.) It is unnecessary to pass on the soundness of this suggestion or to determine whether the gifts to issue are invalidated by the limitations in articles XI and XII or whether
they stand and the limitations only are rejected (see, Gray,
The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed.) § 423, p. 437; Leach,
Perpetuities In A Nutshell, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 638, 655), for if
the interests in favor of the issue are invalid they are separable from the interests created in Arturo and Manlio.
The leading case in this state setting forth the principle
of separability is Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 11 [60 P. 471],
which reduced the problem to a determination of the testator's intention pursuant to Civil Code, section 1317 (now
Prob. Code, § 101), which provides that" ... A will is to be
construed according to the intention of the testator. Where
his intention cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have
effect as far as possible." Applying this principle, the court
formulated the rule that "valid trusts should not be disregarded because in the instrument creating them one particular invalid trust is d.,clared, unless the latter is so inseparably blended with the others that it cannot be eliminated
without destroying the main intent of the trustor, or working
manifest injustice to the other beneficiaries." This principle
has become a settled rule of decision in this court. (Estate
of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 532 [60 P. 442, 64 P. 1000, 84 Am.St.
Rep. 70]; affirmed 136 Cal. 79, 81 [68 P.306]; Nellis v.
Rickard, 133 Cal. 617, 620 [66 P. 32, 85 Am.St.Rep. 227];
Estate of Pichoir, 139 Cal. 682, 685-686 [73 P. 606] ; Sacramento Bank v. Montgomery, 146 Cal. 745, 747 [81 P. 138] ;
Estate of Oampbell, 175 Cal. 345, 351 [165 P. 931] ; Estate of
Whitney, 176 Cal. 12, 19 [167 P. 399] ; Estate of Phelps, 182
Cal. 752, 763 [190 P. 17] ; Estate of Van lVyck, 185 Cal. 49,
62 [196 P. 50] ; Estate of Maltman, 195 Cal. 643, 654 [234 P.
898] j Estate of Troy, 214 Cal. 53, 59-64 [3 P.2d 930] j Estate

;;.
i~

;i

il!

ii

I:'

i i:

'Ii

Iii
Ii'
d
i1.

1 ;

,I

:}iI'
~I !.

910

ESTATE OF MICHELETTI

[24 C.2d

of Gump, 16 Cal.2d 535, 547 [107 P.2d 17] ; see Rest., Property [Group No.1] Proposed Final Draft No. 5 [19441,
p. 111; Rest., Trusts [1936], § 65, comment d; Freund, Three
Suggestions Concerning Future Intere~ts, 33 Harv.L.Rev.
526, 531; Leach, Perpetuities In a Nutshell, 51 Harv.L.Rev.
638, 656-657.)
[3] The statutory rules against restraints on alienation
have a beneficial purpose, but they are not punitive.
[4] Testamentary dispositions that are otherwise valid are
not necessarily invalidated by illegal limitations, and the testator's purpose must control so far as it reasonably can.
(See Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411, 413 [24 S.Ct. 487, 48
L.Ed. 730] ; Landram v. Jordan, 203 U.S. 56, 63 [27 S.Ct. 17,
51 L.Ed. 88]; and Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of A.rt,
[S.D. N.Y. 1923], 292 F. 303, 304; see, also, 27 Cal.L.Re-v:.
86, 87; Freund, op. cit. supra, p. 533.)
[5] It would hardly be possible to discover whether a
testator actually intended that a prior limitation should
stand if a subsequent limitation failed, for the testator would
ordinarily not anticipate the partial ineffectiveness of his di~
position. (See Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law
[appendix VIII, 1909], § 702; Rest., Property [Future Interests, part 1 and 2, 1936], Introductory Note to chap. 16,
p. 930, Monograph on Ineffectiveness of an Ultimate Executory Interest, appendix, p. 34.) Nevertheless, there must be
rules governing testamentary dispositions that are partially
ineffective. The objective of the rules formulated is to ascertain what the testator would have intended had he foreseen
a partial failure of his expressed plan. (Gray, op. cit. supra,
§ 703; Rest., Property, op. cit. supra, p. 930.) Decisive weight
is given the judicially construed intention of the testator.
(Rest., Property, op. cit. supra, § 228.) Material considerations are the language of the conveyance, including the extent
to which the use of the same phrase or clause to define the
duration of the prior interest and to attempt the creation of
the succeeding interest is to be regarded as a mere economy
of words in the creation of two independent or two interdependent interests; the circumstances surrounding the disposition; the ineffectiveness of the attempted succeeding interest;
whether the testator prepared the will or employed an at·
torney to do so. and the apparent skill of the draftsman in
the use of language or of legal phraseology; knowledge or
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belief of the testator concerning the claimants upon his
bounty, and the age of the testator and of the donees. (Prob.
Code, § 105; Rest., Property, op. cit. supra, comment g; Rest.,
Property [Future Interest, parts 3 and 4, 1940] § 242 and
comments, pp. 1199-1205.)
[2b] The application of these principles to the facts of the
present case leads to the conclusion that if the executory interests in the issue of Arturo and Manlio were invalid, the
testator would have preferred the trust to stand free of such
interests. The purpose of the trust was to provide for the
support and education of the children of the second marriage
and to preserve the bulk of the testator's estate for the chi1~
dren until they were old enough to manage large sums of
money. The repeated reference to Arturo ahd Manlio by
name throughout the will, the fact that an attorney drafted
the will, the gift to them of the remainder interests in the
personal effects of the testator, their youth at the time the
will was drawn, the age of the testator, and the amount of the
testator's estate to go into the testamentary trust in relation
to the gifts to appellant and Ote110 give rise to the inference
that the minor sons were the special objects of the testator's
bounty. The language and draftsmanship of the will
strengthen this view. The care used in selecting the dispositive language for the successors to the testator's personal ef,fects and the beneficiaries of the trust of the residue indicates
an awareness of the rule against remoteness in vesting. It is
in marked contrast to the lack of care in the phrasing of the
executory interests, notably the failure to provide for the contingencies of death of the children of the second marriage
before the times for distribution of the trust estate. In these
events the; testator would die intestate as to the bulk of his
property. These factors indicate that the testator's first con. cern was for the children of his second marriage, and that
had he contemplated possible failure of the executory limitations to their issue he would have provided that the trust
for these children stand.
Appellant relies upon Estate of Whitney, supraj Estate of
Van Wyck, supraj Estate of Maltman, supraj and Sheean v.
Michel, 16 Ca1.2d 324 [57 P.2d 127], in opposing the rule of
separability in the present case. In each of these cases, however, the court refused to apply the rule, on the ground that
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it would defeat the entire scheme and purpose of the testator.
Thus, in Estate of Whitney, supra, at 19, the court prevented
a result that would have been contrary to the testator's plan
"and to which it cannot be supposed that he did consent or
would have consented." In Estate of Van Wyck, supra, at
pages 62, 63, the court did not countenance a separation of the
invalid part of a trust from the valid part, for the beneficiaries would then have owned the remainder and no purpose
could be served by the interpositi:m of the trust. In the present case the very purpose of the trust was to support the children and to withhold the remainder until they were capable
of managing it. The valid part of the trust in Estate of Maltman, supra, at page 653, was not allowed to stand because it
would have resulted in defeating the testator's plan and was
unfair to one of the beneficiaries. The trust was for the equal
benefit of the testator's son and daughter, and if the otherwise valid provisions had been preserved, the daughter would
have received three-fourths of the estate and the son but onefourth, contrary to the testator's wishes. In Sheean v. Michel,
supra, at 329, the court refused to make a separation that
would have defeated not only the express purpose of the testator but also the claims of creditors.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J.,
and Schauer, J., concurred.

[So F. No. 17019. In Bank.

Oct. 2, 1944.J

SAM L. COLLINS, Petitioner, v. HARRY B. RILEY, as
State Controller, etc., Respondent.
[1] Legislature-Expenses of Members-Oonstruction of Statute
Authorizing Rcimbursement.-Since all presumptions and intendments are in favor of the validity and constitutionality
of legislativo acts, and since such acts will be given a construcMcK, Dig. References: [1,2,4,6] Legislature, § 68; [3] Constitutional Law, § 2; [5J Public Officers, § l03&.
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tion consistent with validity if possible, it must be presumed
that the Legislature in enacting that part of Pol. Code, § 352,
which authorizes the payment of "actual necessary traveling
expenses" to members of the Legislature, did not intend to
increase the mileage allowance covered by Const., art. IV,
§ 23, but only to provide reimbursement for a member's actual
living expenses when attending a session of the Legislature.
[2a, 2b] Id. - Expenses of Members - Oonstruction of Oonstitutional Provision.-Const.,art. tv, § 23, which provides. that
legislators "shall receive for their services" a stated sum "and
mileage . . . not to exceed five cents per mile," does not expressly prohibit the allowance of other expenses, and the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alteriuB cannot be relied
on to support or incorporate additional restrictions' so as
to render invalid Pol. Code, § 352, insofar as it authorizes
paymcnt of traveling expenses to the legislators. The constitutional provisions for payment are limitations on the
amounts which may be allowed for the purposes specified,
and the doctrine of expressio unius can only operate to exclude
additional limitations, thereby leaving the Legislature free to
act.
[3] Oonstitutional Law - Legislature - Extent of Powers.-The
state Constitution is not a grant of power but rather a limitation or restriction on the powers of the Legislature. Such
restrictions and limitations are to be construed strictly, and
are not to be extended to include matters not covered by the
language used.
[4] Legislature-Expenses of Members-Validity of Statute Authorizing Reimbursement.-Pol. Code, § 352, insofar as it authorizes the payment of traveling expenses to each legislator,
does not constitute an improper increase in the compensation
provided for by Const., art. IV, § 23, since the state's repayment of such expenses is not the giving of additional compensation, but merely a reimbursement to the legislator for actual
cash outlays necessarily incurred for maintenance while away
from his home in the performance of his duty. (Conflicting
language in Oounty of Placer v. Freeman, 149 Cal. 738, 87 P.
628, and in Oounty of Santa Barbara v. Bucker, 35 Cal.App.
676, 170 P. 860, disapproved.)
[5] Public Officers-Oompensation and Expenses-Traveling Expenses.-When an officer is required to travel in order to perform his duty, the payment of his actual necessary living
expenses while away from home is a proper item of state ex-

[3] See 5 Oal.Jur. 666; 11 Am.Jur. 619.
[6] See 43 Am.Jur. 154.

